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In this paper we present and discuss a simple financial accelerator agent-based model,
whose conceptual core is the interaction of heterogeneous firms and the banking system.
Its simplicity notwithstanding, the model is able to replicate through simulations a large
number of stylized facts concerning the shape and evolution over time of the distribution
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s a large body of literature—sometimes referred to as the financial
accelerator hypothesis, broad credit view, or balance sheet channel—focused on
the role of financial factors in business fluctuations and in the transmission of
monetary shocks [Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990, 1995), Bernanke et al. (1996,
1999), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1990, 1993), Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003)].
Insightful new additions to the literature, albeit along different lines, have been
provided by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2002) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
In these models, in principle, agents are heterogeneous, and sometimes it is
also recognized that heterogeneity is a necessary ingredient of important business
cycle features (such as composition effects), but the nature and consequences of
heterogeneity are not thoroughly explored. At a certain point of the analysis, the
representative agent pops up and heterogeneity gets lost or is simply neglected.
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The temptation to keep the analysis simple by resorting to the representative
agent is understandable. After all, the representative agent framework has been
one of the most successful tools in economics [Hartley (1997); Stoker (1993)]
and is still the cornerstone of standard macroeconomics. This modeling strategy,
however, is justified if heterogeneity is temporary, that is, if the population of dif-
ferent households/firms converges over time to a stationary distribution in which
agents are identical. This condition is generally not fulfilled empirically. In real
economies heterogeneity is not bound to disappear and the evolution over time of
the distribution of heterogeneous agents affects the dynamics of the macrovari-
ables. If macroeconomic modeling relies on the representative agent, therefore, the
analysis of business fluctuations and of the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy will be too simple and sometimes even simplistic.
In this and in a companion paper [Delli Gatti et al. (2005)],1 we explore the
consequences of heterogeneity of firms’ size and degree of financial fragility in a
financial accelerator model along the lines of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
To overcome the intrinsic difficulty of dealing with many heterogeneous firms,
we adopt the agent-based framework. The evolution over time of microvariables
such as the individual level of capital stock, net worth, and output can be tracked
by means of simulations. In each period, macrovariables are determined by adding
up the levels of the microvariables (bottom-up procedure).
Our model is very simple. Only two markets are considered, goods and credit.
In the goods market, output is supply-driven: by assumption, firms can sell all the
output they (optimally) decide to produce. Because firms adopt a linear technology
whose only input is capital, output follows the evolution over time of the capital
stock, which in turn is determined by investment. Finally, investment depends on
the interest rate and the degree of financial fragility, which is inversely related to
the equity base or net worth. In fact, each firm runs the risk of default, which yields
additional bankruptcy costs. The higher the equity base, the lower the probability
of bankruptcy and the higher the level of supply and investment.
Firms raise funds on the credit market. The demand for credit is related to
investment expenditure and therefore it depends on the interest rate. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that banks are lumped together in a vertically integrated
banking sector (“the bank” for short). The supply of credit is a multiple of the
bank’s equity base because the bank adopts a (spontaneous or enforced through
prudential regulation) system of risk management based upon a target equity/loans
ratio. Each firm is allotted a portion of total credit proportional to the collateral
it can provide, that is, its capital stock. The equilibrium rate of interest for each
firm—and therefore its investment and output decisions—therefore depends on
the bank’s and the firm’s net worth.
If a firm goes bankrupt, aggregate output shrinks and the equity base of the
banking system is eroded by nonperforming loans or “bad debt.” As a conse-
quence, credit extended goes down, pushing up the interest rate charged to each
and every firm. Some of the firms that were on the brink of bankruptcy will
default and leave the market, whereas the surviving firms will curtail investment
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and production. Bankruptcies will spread and a domino or snowball effect will
follow.
The source of the domino effect is the positive feedback of bankruptcy on aggre-
gate financial fragility, which in turn is a consequence of the indirect interaction of
firms through the banking system: if one firm goes bankrupt, the terms on which
the others get credit become more restrictive and their debt commitments become
heavier.2
The model is extremely simple but capable of replicating through simulations
several stylized facts emphasized in the empirical literature:
the distribution of firms’ size is right-skewed and described by a power law [Axtell
(2001), Gaffeo et al. (2003)];
cumulative output changes during expansions and contractions follow a Weibull distri-
bution [Di Guilmi et al. (2003)];
the growth rate of aggregate and individual output follow similar Laplace distributions
[Stanley et al. (1996), Canning et al. (1998)];
the power law distribution of firms’ sizes shifts and rotates over the business cycle
[Gaffeo et al. (2003)];
the age of exiting firms is exponentially distributed [Fujiwara (2003)];
the distribution of profits follows a power law and is characterized by the time reversal
property [Fujiwara et al. (2004)];
bad debt follows a Weibull distribution [Delli Gatti et al. (2004)].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present
and discuss the (optimal) production and investment decisions of the single firm.
In the present context, capital accumulation turns out to depend on the financial
conditions of the firm, proxied by the net worth of the previous period. Section 3
is devoted to discussion of banks’ lending decisions. In equilibrium, each firm
is charged an interest rate that depends on the net worth, that is, the financial
condition, of the firm and the banking system. Incorporating these results into the
law of motion of microvariables such as the capital stock and the equity base of the
firms and simulating the model (see the Appendix for the details on the simulation
procedure), we can replicate the stylized facts listed above, as shown in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2. FIRMS
In each period, there are a large number—say Nt—of firms. Nt changes over time
due to industrial dynamics. Firms produce a homogeneous good using a constant-
returns-to-scale technology whose unique input is capital. We assume that the
output of the ith firm (Yit ) increases linearly with capital (Kit ) according to the
production function Yit = φKit , where φ is the productivity of capital, constant
and uniform across firms.
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that production decisions are not
constrained by aggregate demand: firms can sell all the output they (optimally)
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decide to produce.3 Thanks to this simplifying assumption, we can focus on the
supply side of the model.
Firms differ according to their financial condition. The financial robustness of
a firm is proxied by the equity base or net worth Ait .
Firms sell their output at an uncertain price. The individual selling price Pit is a
random variable with expected value Pt , the market price, and finite variance. As
a consequence, the relative price uit = Pit/Pt is a random variable with expected
value E (uit ) = 1 and finite variance. Moreover, firms are rationed on the equity
market and have to rely on banks to obtain external finance. Debt commitments
are ritKit , where rit is the interest rate (which will be determined on the credit
market; see Section 3).4
Profit in real terms is
πit = PitYit − ritPtKit
Pt
= (uitφ − rit ) Kit . (1)
Because of the uncertain environment, firms may go bankrupt. Bankruptcy
occurs if net worth at time t becomes negative. The firm accumulates net worth
by means of profits. The law of motion of net worth therefore is5
Ait = Ait−1 + πit = Ait−1 + (uitφ − rit ) Kit . (2)
The firm goes bankrupt if Ait < 0; that is,
uit <
rit
φ
− Ait−1
φKit
≡ u¯it . (3)
In other words, bankruptcy occurs if the relative price uit falls below the critical
threshold u¯it . When a firm goes bankrupt, it leaves the market. The Greenwald
and Stiglitz framework, therefore, provides a simple and straightforward way to
model the exit process: a firm goes out of the market if its financial conditions are
so fragile—that is, its equity is so low—that an adverse shock makes net worth
become negative, or if it suffers a loss so huge as to deplete all the net worth
accumulated in the past.6
The probability of bankruptcy is Pr(uit < u¯it ) = (u¯it ), where (.) denotes
the c.d.f. of uit . Therefore, the probability of bankruptcy is an increasing function
of the interest rate and the capital stock and a decreasing function of the equity
base inherited from the past. For the sake of simplicity, in the following we assume
that uit is distributed uniformly on the interval (0, 2) so that we can specify the
probability of bankruptcy as
Pr(uit < u¯it ) = u¯it /2 = rit2φ −
Ait−1
2φKit
. (4)
Bankruptcy is costly and the cost of bankruptcy is increasing with the scale of
production. For the sake of analytical convenience, bankruptcy costs are increasing
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and quadratic in the level of output:
CBit = cY 2it , (5)
where c is a positive parameter.
Following Greenwald and Stiglitz, we assume that the firm is formally risk-
neutral, but it evaluates in each period the probability of bankruptcy and corrects
expected profit accordingly. Therefore, the firm’s objective function is the differ-
ence between expected profit,
E(πit ) = (φ − rit ) Kit , (6)
and the cost of bankruptcy in case bankruptcy occurs: CBit Pr(uit < u¯it ). Taking
into account (6), (5), and (4) and recalling that Yit = φKit , we can formulate the
problem of the firm as:7
max
Kit
E(πit ) − CBit Pr(uit < u¯it ) = (φ − rit ) Kit − φc2
(
ritK
2
it − KitAit−1
)
.
From the first-order conditions (FOC) we obtain
Kit = φ − rit
cφrit
+ Ait−1
2rit
. (7)
According to (7), the (optimal) capital stock is an increasing linear function of
the equity base (lagged one period) and a decreasing nonlinear function of the
interest rate. Assuming no depreciation, the law of motion of the capital stock is
Kit = Kit−1 + Iit , where Iit is investment. The rate of capital accumulation of the
ith firm therefore is
gKit :=
Kit − Kit−1
Kit−1
= φ − rit
cφritKit−1
+ ait−1
2rit
− 1, (8)
where ait−1 = Ait−1Kit−1 is the equity ratio of the firm, an indicator of financial
robustness.
Substituting (7) into (1), we obtain
πit = (uitφ − rit ) φ − rit
cφrit
+ (uitφ − rit ) Ait−12rit . (9)
When (9) is substituted into (2), the law of motion of the equity base of the ith
firm turns out to be
Ait =
(
1 + uitφ − rit
2rit
)
Ait−1 + (uitφ − rit )φ − rit
cφrit
. (10)
The equity base in period t depends linearly on the equity base lagged one
period and nonlinearly on the interest rate.
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Because firms raise funds only on the credit market, due to equity rationing
[Greenwald et al. (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984)], capital accumulation is
financed by means of internal funds (retained profits) and new bank loans; we can
write
Iit = πit−1 + Lit .
Using the definitions Iit = Kit − Kit−1 and Lit = Lit − Lit−1 and substituting
equations (7), one obtains the demand for credit of the ith firm,
Lit =
(
φ − rit
cφrit
+ Ait−1
2rit
)
− Ait−1 − πit−1. (11)
3. BANKS
For the sake of simplicity and as a first step toward a more satisfactory but
necessarily more complex framework, we assume that banks are lumped together
in a vertically integrated banking sector (“the bank” hereafter). Therefore many
heterogeneous firms interact with only one bank on the credit market.
To determine the supply of credit and its allocation to each firm, let us start
from the bank’s balance sheet. Without loss of generality, let us assume that there
are no reserve requirements. Therefore Lt = Dt + Abt where Lt is the aggregate
supply of credit and Dt and Abt represent deposits and the equity base of the bank,
respectively.
The bank tries to avoid excess lending by targeting a risk coefficient α =
Abt−1/Lt—that is, a minimum “capital requirement” of equity (of the previous
period) per unit of credit extended—either because of a discretionary strategy
of risk management [Estrella et al. (2000)] or as a consequence of prudential
regulation on the part of the monetary authorities. Therefore the aggregate supply
of credit turns out to be a multiple (1/α) of equity: Lt = Abt−1/α.
Credit has to be allotted to the heterogeneous firms. Because of asymmetric
information, the bank does not know the “true” equity of each borrower, but can
observe its size, which is used as a proxy for collateral. We assume that the ith
firm obtains a portion of total credit equal to its relative size, that is, to the ratio of
the ith firm capital stock to the aggregate capital stock (of the previous period),
Lsit = Lt
Kit−1
Kt−1
, (12)
where Kt =
∑Nt
i=1 Kit . In other words, highly capitalized (i.e., collateralized)
borrowers benefit from a large credit flow and vice versa. Hence
Lsit =
1
α
Abt−1
Kt−1
Kit−1. (13)
The credit market is in equilibrium when total demand for bank loans is equal to
aggregate supply, that is, when the demand for credit of each firm [see equation
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(11)] is equal to the credit extended by the bank to that firm [equation (12)].
Imposing the equilibrium condition, one gets the equilibrium interest rate:
rit = 2 + cAit−12c( 1
cφ
+ Lsit + πit−1 + Ait−1
) . (14)
The profit of the bank, bt , is the difference between revenues, that is, interest
payments on loans extended to solvent firms (∑i∈Nt ritLit ), and costs due to the
remuneration of deposits (rDt Dt−1) and of the bank’s own capital (r¯tAbt−1):
bt =
∑
i∈Nt
ritLit − rDt Dt−1 − r¯tAbt−1, (15)
where rDt is the rate of interest on deposits and r¯t is the rate of return on the bank’s
equity.
To close the model, we assume that the rate of return on the bank’s equity is
equal to the average interest rate on loans, that is, r¯t = 1Lt
∑
i∈Nt ritLit , and that
the interest rate on deposits is determined by means of a markdown on the average
interest rate, that is, rDt = r¯t (1 − ω). Therefore (15) boils down to8
bt = r¯t
{
Lt −
[
Abt−1 + (1 − ω)Dt−1
]}
. (16)
From the balance sheet equation Dt−1 = Lt−1 − Abt−1. Moreover, Lt = Abt−1/α
and Lt−1 = Abt−2/α. Substituting these expressions into (16) and rearranging, we
get
bt =
r¯t
α
[
(1 − ωα)Abt−1 − (1 − ω)Abt−2
]
. (17)
Notice that, by construction, the average interest rate is affected by the equity base
(Ait−1) and the relative size (Kit−1Kt−1 ) of the solvent firms and by the equity base of
the bank Abt−1, which are the determinants of the interest rates on loans extended
to the single firms. Therefore, the profit of the bank reflects in a complicated way
the financial conditions and the relative size of the borrowing firms and its own
financial robustness, captured by the equity base (of the previous periods).
When a firm goes bankrupt, the bank records a nonperforming loan or “bad
debt,” which will affect its own equity base negatively. We can define the bad debt
as Bit = −Ait if Ait < 0, that is, if the ith firm belongs to the set Ft of bankrupt
firms. The total amount of bad debt therefore is
∑
i∈Ft Bit =
∑
i∈Ft −Ait .
The bank’s equity base evolves according to the following law of motion; Abt =
Abt−1 + bt −
∑
i∈Ft −Ait . Substituting (17) into this expression and rearranging,
one gets
Abt =
[
1 + r¯t
α
(1 − ωα)
]
Abt−1 −
r¯t
α
(1 − ω)Abt−2 −
∑
i∈Ft
−Ait . (18)
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If a firm goes bankrupt, therefore, not only aggregate output but also the bank’s
equity goes down. As a consequence, aggregate credit goes down, pushing up the
interest rate and increasing the risk of bankruptcy for the other firms. Some of
the firms that were on the brink of bankruptcy will default and leave the market,
and the surviving firms will curtail investment and production. Bankruptcies will
spread and a domino effect will follow.
4. SIMULATIONS
We ran simulations to study the dynamics of the model. There are only four
parameters, which are calibrated as follows: φ = 0.1, c = 1, α = 0.08, and
ω = 0.02. Details on the simulation procedure can be found in the Appendix.
The behavior of aggregate output is shown in Figure 1. Phases of smooth
growth follow periods of large output variability; sudden drifts appear from time
to time. Each phase of the business cycle has its own amplitude, duration, and
depth. There is evidence of asymmetry between expansions and recessions. The
standard deviation and autocorrelation of output are 0.27 and 0.79, respectively.
The corresponding figures for investment are 1.42 and 0.47.
According to equation (8), growth and fluctuations can be attributed to changes
in the equity ratio: the more financially sound a firm is, the more it can invest
and grow. Shifts, drifts, and volatility changes, however, can be attributed to the
interaction of firms and the banking system. In fact, changes in the firms’ and the
bank’s net worth feed back on the interest rate via the credit market.
Simulations also show that output variance may change over time. This fact
can be attributed to changes of the ratio of large to small firms due to interaction
FIGURE 1. Aggregate output (in logs).
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FIGURE 2. Power law of firms’ size.
and random idiosyncratic shocks. Gabaix (2002) claims that if big firms have a
large share of total production, micro shocks will induce large macrofluctuations.
In fact, if a large firm goes bankrupt, the aggregate output loss is significant, bad
debt spreads through a domino effect and propagates the shock.
We now turn to the stylized facts concerning the shape and evolution over time
of the distribution of firms’ size, rate of growth, profit and age.
As to firms’ size, the empirical literature [Axtell (2001), Gaffeo et al. (2003)]
found that the distribution of firms’ size is right-skewed and follows a power
law. Also, the distribution of firms’ size in the simulated data is characterized by
persistent heterogeneity and is described by a power law, as shown in the plot of
firms’ size proxied by the capital stock against the frequency on the log–log plane
(Figure 2).
Gaffeo et al. (2003) found in the data that
during expansions, the distribution of firms’ size shifts to the right—that is, the intercept
of the interpolating line in the log–log plane increases;
the scaling exponent, that is, the slope of the regression line, increases during the
transition from recession to expansion.
Our simulations replicate these results. The Zipf plots for three different periods
of constant growth reported in Figure 3 show the shifting power laws during
expansions. In Figure 4 we report the distribution during expansions (circles)
and recessions (squares). The slopes of the interpolation lines are 3.30 and 2.60,
respectively. Hence, also, for simulated data, the scaling exponent in recessions is
lower than in expansions. This means that during upturns concentration goes up.
Di Guilmi et al. (2004) found that the plot of cumulative rates of change of GDP
for industrialized countries against their rank in a log–log plane is characterized by
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FIGURE 3. Distributions for two successive periods of expansion (solid symbols) and a
period of recession (empty squares).
a large downward curvature, a feature of the Weibull distribution.9 The Zipf plot
of aggregate cumulative rates of change obtained from our simulations displays
the same behavior (see Figure 5, which has diamonds for recessions and circles
for expansions).
FIGURE 4. Different distributions for firms during expansions (circles) and recessions
(squares).
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FIGURE 5. Cumulative rates of changes in output.
In the same paper, the rates of change during expansions and recessions were
interpolated by a Weibull rank regression line, obtaining a good fit. The test of
such a distribution for simulated data confirms the reliability of the model (see Fig-
ure 6). The fit is very good in both cases (R2 is over 0.99), even if the estimation
FIGURE 6. Weibull rank regression for rates of expansion (circles) and recession (diamonds).
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FIGURE 7. Laplace distributions of output (squares) and capital (circles) growth rates.
of the slope parameter returns slightly higher values than the ones found in real
data.
Canning et al. (1998) found in the data that the distribution of the annual growth
rate of GDP is tent-shaped and characterized by exponential scaling. Moreover,
Stanley et al. (1996) showed that
the empirical distribution of firms’ growth rates (in the United States) can be approxi-
mated by a tent-shaped curve;
the distribution of the growth rates of firms’ size and aggregate output are similar.
In agreement with the evidence reported in the papers above, the rate of change
of aggregate output for simulated data follows a Laplace distribution (squares in
Figure 7) similar to the distribution of the growth rates of firms’ size (circles).
The data obtained from our simulations do not collapse onto the same curve: the
distribution of firms’ growth rates seems to exhibit a slightly steeper slope.
Fujiwara (2003) plots the age of exiting firms (in Japan) against the log of their
rank. The distribution is exponential, as shown by the good linear fit. We apply
the same procedure to simulated data, plotting the ages of exiting firms against
the log of their absolute frequency (see Figure 8). The OLS interpolation returns
an R2 of 0.99.
As widely acknowledged since the pioneering work of Pareto on personal
income (1897), firms’ operating revenues are also distributed as a power law, with
exponent very close to 1. Fujiwara (2003) and Di Guilmi et al. (2003) found in the
data that
the distribution of profits is described by a power law;
the distribution of profits is characterized by time-reversal symmetry [see Fujiwara et al.
(2004)].10
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FIGURE 8. Exponential distribution of firms exits sorted by age.
Also, the pattern of the simulated distribution of profits is of the power law
type and displays the time-reversal property. The scatter diagram obtained for
simulated data shown in Figure 9, in which every point represents a firm, is similar
to the ones reported in the above-mentioned papers.
Di Guilmi et al. (2004) found that bad debt data follow a stretched exponential
distribution. Data on bad debt obtained from the simulation (Figure 10) follow a
stretched exponential distribution [Laherrere and Sornette (1999)].11
FIGURE 9. Scatterplot of firms’ profits in periods t (x-axis) and t + 1 (y-axis).
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FIGURE 10. Weibull rank regression for bad debt.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a skeletal agent-based model in which the financial
fragility of heterogeneous firms and the banking system and their interaction on
the credit market play a crucial role in shaping the evolution over time of output,
the capital stock, and net worth.
The capability of the model to mimic well-established regularities found in the
empirical data is an encouraging signal of a solid microfoundation. Its simplicity
notwithstanding, in fact, simulations of the model replicate surprisingly well a
whole array of stylized facts: the distribution of firms’ size is right-skewed and
described by a power law that shifts and rotates over the business cycle; cumulative
changes of output during business cycles follow a Weibull distribution; the rates
of change of aggregate and firms’ output follow a similar Laplace distribution; the
distribution of the age of exiting firms is exponentially distributed.
The model can be extended in a number of ways to take into account, among
other things, the role of aggregate demand, different degrees of market power
on the goods and credit markets, policy variables, and learning processes. Our
conjecture, however, is that the empirical validation of more complex models
will be due to basic ingredients already present in the benchmark framework:
non-linearities, random idiosyncratic shocks, and changing financial conditions of
interacting firms and banks.
NOTES
1. Previous attempts to cope with the same problem are Delli Gatti et al. (2003) and Gallegati
et al. (2003).
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2. Our model, therefore, is populated by heterogeneous and (at least indirectly) interacting agents
in a noisy environment. This scenario recalls the interaction of heterogeneous particles subject to
random shocks that is the main theme of statistical mechanics in contemporary physics. In this case,
self-organizing phenomena can occur. The theory of self-organized criticality [Bak (1997)] has proved
fruitful in many scientific domains and has been applied also in economics [Bak et al. (1993)]. See
also Krugman (1996).
3. Two scenarios are consistent with this assumption. In the equilibrium scenario, aggregate demand
accommodates supply; that is, households and firms absorb all the output produced by the latter and
the goods market is always in equilibrium. In this scenario, aggregate investment must be equal to the
sum of retained profits and households’ saving. As we will see, both investment and retained profit are
determined in the model, so we have to assume that households’ saving adjusts to fill the gap between
the two. In the disequilibrium scenario, aggregate demand does not (necessarily) accommodate supply,
so that the goods market is generally not in equilibrium. In this case, the difference between aggregate
investment on the one hand and the sum of profit and households’ saving on the other shows up as
involuntary inventories decrease.
4. Strictly speaking, because Kit = Lit + Ait , debt commitments are ritLit = rit (Kit − Ait ).
We assume, for the sake of convenience, that firms pay dividends equal to ritAit . Therefore, debt
commitments and dividends sum up to rit (Kit − Ait ) + ritAit = ritKit .
5. Matter of factly, πit is retained profits. Recalling the definition given in the previous note
(Kit = Lit + Ait ) , in fact, it turns out that πit = uitφKit −ritLit −ritAit , that is, revenues (uitφKit )
net of debt commitments (ritLit ) and dividends (ritAit ) .
6. As to the entry process, in the literature, it is modeled either as a purely stochastic process
[Winter et al. (1997)] or as an endogenous process [Hopenhayn (1992)] in which the number of
entrants depends on the current profit margins. On empirical grounds, we are not able to discriminate
between the two views. For the sake of simplicity, in the simulations we model entry as a stochastic
process. The number of entrant firms is drawn from a normal distribution. For a detailed discussion
and a different modelling of industrial dynamics in Greenwald–Stiglitz models see Delli Gatti et al.
(2003).
7. For high equity ratios the term CBit Pr(uit < u¯it ) is negative. In this case the following objecting
function is still valid thinking at this term as a premium for financially solid firms.
8. Recalling (12) and (13), interest payments on loans can be expressed in different ways:
∑
i∈Nt
ritLit = Lt
Kt−1
∑
i∈Nt
ritKit−1 =
Abt−1
α
1
Kt−1
∑
i∈Nt
ritKit−1.
Using the first equality, the average interest rate is
r¯t ≡ 1
Lt
∑
i∈Nt
ritLit = 1
Kt−1
∑
i∈Nt
ritKit−1.
Multiplying both sides of the definition by Lt , one gets
∑
i∈Nt ritLit = r¯tLt .
9. Cumulative rates of change measure the gross change in output over consecutive periods char-
acterized by changes of the same sign (expansions and recessions, respectively).
10. Time-reversal symmetry occurs when the joint distribution of profits in t and t − 1 does not
change after exchanging the profits recorded in t and t − 1 by each firm.
11. The shape parameter is equal to 0.7654 for simulated data and 0.7060 for real data. In comparing
simulated to real data on bad debt, however, a word of caution is appropriate. So far we have used
yearly data for firms. Delli Gatti et al. (2004) resorted to monthly data because usually banks record
their unpaid credits on a monthly basis. Aggregating the monthly observations of the real data set
to obtain yearly data, the two distributions become more similar, because the shape parameter is
0.7658.
AGENT-BASED MODEL 77
REFERENCES
Axtell, R. (2001) Zipf distribution of US firm sizes. Science 293, 1818–1820.
Bak, P. (1997) How Nature Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bak, P., K. Chen, J. Scheinkman, and M.Woodford (1993) Aggregate fluctuations from independent
sectoral shocks: Self-organized criticality in a model of production and inventory dynamics. Ricerche
Economiche 47, 3–30.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1989) Agency costs, net worth and business fluctuations. American
Economic Review 79, 14–31.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1990) Financial fragility and economic performance. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 105, 87–144.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1995) Inside the black box: The credit channel of monetary policy
transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (4), 27–48.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and M. Gilchrist (1996) The financial accelerator and the flight to quality.
Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (1), 1–15.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and M. Gilchrist (1999) The financial accelerator in a quantitative business
cycle framework. In J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, pp. 1341–
1393. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Canning, D., L. Amaral, Y.M.M. Lee, and E. Stanley (1998) Scaling the volatility of GDP growth
rates. Economics Letters 60, 335–341.
Cooley, T. and V. Quadrini (2001) Financial markets and firm dynamics. American Economic Review
91 (5), 1286–1310.
Delli Gatti, D., C. Di Guilmi, E. Gaffeo, and M. Gallegati (2004) Bankruptcy as an exit mechanism
for systems with a variable number of components. Physica A 344, 8–13.
Delli Gatti, D., C. Di Guilmi, E. Gaffeo, M. Gallegati, G. Giulioni, and A. Palestrini (2005) A new
approach to business fluctuations: Heterogeneous interacting agents, scaling laws and financial
fragility. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 56, 489–512.
Delli Gatti, D., M. Gallegati, G. Giulioni, and A. Palestrini (2003) Financial fragility, patterns of firms’
entry and exit and aggregate dynamics. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 51, 79–
97.
Di Guilmi, A., E. Gaffeo, and M. Gallegati (2004) Empirical results on the size distribution of business
cycle phases. Physica A 333, 325—334.
Estrella, A., S. Park, and S. Peristiani (2000) Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure. FRBNY
Economic Policy Review 6 (2), July.
Fujiwara, Y. (2003) Data analysis of Japanese bankruptcy. Mimeo, ATR (Advanced Telecommunication
Research Institute International), Kyoto, Japan.
Fujiwara, Y., C. Di Guilmi, H. Aoyama, M. Gallegati, and W. Souma (2004) Do Pareto–Zipf and
Gibrat’s laws hold true? An analysis with European firms. Physica A 335, 197–216.
Gabaix, X. (2002) Power laws and the origins of the business cycle. Technical report 484, Econometric
Society.
Gaffeo, E., M. Gallegati, and A. Palestrini (2003) On the size distribution of firms: Additional evidence
from the G7 countries. Physica A 324, 117–123.
Gallegati, M., G. Giulioni, and N. Kichiji (2003) Complex dynamics and financial fragility in an
agent-based model. Advances in Complex Systems 6, 267–282.
Greenwald, B. and J. Stiglitz (1988) Imperfect information, finance constraints and business fluctua-
tions. In M. Kohn and S. Tsiang (eds.), Finance Constraints, Expectations and Macroeconomics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greenwald, B. and J. Stiglitz (1990) Macroeconomic models with equity and credit rationing. In R.
Hubbard (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Greenwald, B. and J. Stiglitz (1993) Financial market imperfections and business cycles. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 108, 77–114.
Greenwald, B., J. Stiglitz, and A. Weiss (1984) Informational imperfections in the capital market and
macroeconomic fluctuations. American Economic Review 74 (2) 194–199.
78 D. DELLI GATTI ET AL.
Hartley R.I. (1997) The Representative Agent in Macroeconomics. London: Routledge.
Hopenhayn, H. (1992) Entry, exit and firm dynamics in long-run equilibrium. Econometrica 60,
1127–1150.
Kiyotaki, N. and G. Moore (1997) Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.
Kiyotaki, N. and G. Moore (2002) Balance-sheet contagion. American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings 92, 46–50.
Krugman, P. (1996) The Self-Organizing Economy. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Laherrere and Sornette (1999) Stretched exponential distribution in nature and economy: Fat tails with
characteristic scale. European Physical Journal B 2 (4), 525–539.
Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have
information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187–221.
Pareto, V. (1897) Course d’Economie Politique, Vol. 2. Paris: Pichou.
Stanley, M., L. Amaral, S. Buldyrev, S. Havlin, H. Leschorn, P. Maas, M. Salinger, and E. Stanley
(1996) Scaling behavior in the growth of companies. Nature 379, 804–806.
Stiglitz, J. and B. Greenwald (2003) Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Stoker, T. (1993) Empirical approaches to the problem of aggregation over individuals. Journal of
Economic Literature 31, 1827–1874.
Winter, S., Y. Kaniovski, and G. Dosi (1997) A Baseline Model of Industry Evolution. Interim Report
111-97-013. Luxemburg: IIASA.
APPENDIX: SIMULATION PROCEDURES
In this Appendix we briefly describe assumptions and procedures followed to run the
simulations. A simulation is completely described by the parameter values, the initial
conditions and the rules to be iterated period after period.
First of all, we set the parameter values and the initial conditions for state variables needed
to start the simulation. There are only four parameters in the model: the productivity of
capital φ, the parameter of the bankruptcy cost equation c, the bank’s equity-loan ratio α,
and the markdown on interest rate ω. They are set as follows: φ = 0.1; c = 1; α = 0.08;
ω = 0.002.
The first step of the simulation occurs at time t = 1. To perform calculations in period 1
for each firm we must set initial conditions for firms’ capital, the equity base, loans, profit,
and bad debt: Ki0, Ai0, Li0, πi0, Bi0. We chose the following:
Ki0 = 100, Ai0 = 40, Li0 = 60, πi0 = 0, Bi0 = 0 (A.1)
These initial conditions are uniform across firms. Therefore in period 0 firms are identical.
The degree of financial robustness as measured by the initial equity ratio is ai0 = 0.4. We
set the initial number of firms at N0 = 1,000.
We must set initial conditions also for the bank. Aggregate credit supply is L0 =∑N0
i=1 Li0 = 60N0. From the definition of credit supply, Lt = Abt−1/α, we can derive the
equity base of the bank in period −1, Ab−1 = αL0 = 0.08×60N0 = 4.8N0. We assume also
that b0 = 0, so that Ab0 = Ab−1. Therefore we can also set D0 = L0 − Ab0 = ( 1α − 1)Ab0 =
11.5 × 4.8N0.
From t = 1 on we have the following list of operations:
1. Bankrupt firms in t − 1 exit the market. Their number is Ft−1.
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2. New firms enter the market. Their number Et is drawn from a normal distribution
with mean µE and variance σ 2E . They are given the initial conditions as in (A.1). The
number of existing (surviving and entrant) firms is
Nt = Nt−1 − Ft−1 + Et .
3. The bank determines the total supply of credit according to
Lt = Abt−1/α.
4. Each firm is charged the interest rate
rit = 2 + cAit−1
2c
{
1
cφ
+ LtKit−1
Kt−1 + πit−1 + Ait−1
} .
This expression reflects equilibrium between demand and availability of credit for
each firm (see note 8).
5. Each firm determines the optimal rate of capital accumulation [see equation (8)],
gKit =
φ − rit
cφritKit−1
+ 1
2rit
ait−1 − 1,
and investment,
Iit = gKit Kit .
6. Each firm determines the demand for loans,
Lit = Lit−1 − πit−1 + Iit .
7. Each firm is hit by the idiosyncratic shock. Therefore profits are
πit = (uitφ − rit ) Kit .
8. The bank calculates the profit,
bt =
∑
i
ritLit − r¯t (1 − ω)Dt−1 − r¯tAbt−1.
9. The bank calculates its equity base,
Abt = bt + Abt−1 −
∑
i∈Ft−1
Bit−1,
and deposit,
Dt = Lt − Abt .
10. Each firm determines its net worth,
Ait = Ait−1 + πit .
11. Each firm is checked for bankruptcy. The number of bankruptcies (Ft ) is determined.
Bad debt is calculated according to
Bit =
{−Ait if Ait < 0
0 if Ait ≥ 0.
12. All the available data (from surviving and bankrupt firms and the bank) are recorded.
We are ready for the next period loop starting again from 1.
